| |
Testimony
to the Senate's Subcommittee on Communications
Details
March 8, 2000
Testimony to the Senate's Subcommittee on Communications
Raj Reddy
Co-Chair, President's Information Technology Advisory Committee
Herbert A. Simon University Professor of Computer Science and Robotics
Carnegie Mellon University
|
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity
to testify about important research and development efforts aimed
at increasing Internet security and protecting our Nation's Information
Infrastructure. My name is Raj Reddy, and I am the Herbert A. Simon
University Professor of Computer Science and Robotics at Carnegie
Mellon University. I also serve as Co-Chair of the President's Information
Technology Advisory Committee, commonly known as PITAC. In the PITAC's
February 1999 report to the President, "Information Technology Research:
Investing in Our Future," we highlighted the need for increased investment
in network security, as well as other important research areas. Today,
on behalf of PITAC, I will provide you with insight into the state
of Internet security in our country and outline some of the PITAC
recommendations that will help our Nation build and support a more
reliable, available, secure, and scalable Internet. I will also present
my personal views on an R&D strategy for developing and demonstrating
highly dependable networks.
|
Background
While advances in information technology have created unprecedented
economic growth and transformed our lives in thousands of positive
ways, weaknesses still exist that enable malicious hackers to disrupt
Internet service and overload popular Web sites. An analysis of the
highly visible disruptions to Internet access reveals a wide range
of causes, including denial of service attacks from malicious hackers
using insecure hosts infected with "zombie" diseases (Yahoo!), software
bugs (Ameritrade), insecure configurations (Schwab), change management
(E-trade), and security loopholes (Hotmail, Melissa). PITAC shares
Congress' concern about these recent hacker attacks. In our report
to the President, we observed that "the Internet is growing well beyond
the intent of its original designers and our ability to extend its
use has created enormous challenges. As the size, capability, and
complexity of the Internet grows, it is imperative that we do the
necessary research to learn how to build and use large, complex, highly-reliable,
and secure systems... It is therefore important that the Federal government
undertake research on topics ranging from network reliability and
bandwidth, to robust, reliable, secure ways to deliver and to protect
critical information." In our report, we recommended a research agenda
to help ensure the survivability of our information infrastructure
in the face of malicious attacks or viruses, equipment or software
failures, and overload. Before I discuss the specifics of the R&D
agenda for Internet security, I would first like to briefly summarize
the findings and recommendations of our report.
|
The PITAC Report Findings and Recommendations
The PITAC was established pursuant to the High Performance Computing
Act of 1991 and was tasked to look at a number of issues in high performance
computing and communications. After a detailed review of the Federal
IT R&D programs, we concluded that U.S. leadership in IT provides
an essential foundation for promoting economic growth, education and
research, environmental stewardship, public health, and national security.
We also concluded that there has been an erosion of support for long-term
fundamental research in IT and that current research is too focused
on near-term problems linked to agency missions. Our Committee recommended
that the Federal government create a strategic initiative for long-term
R&D and increase funding for IT R&D by $1.4 billion by fiscal year
2004 over the fiscal year 1999 base programs funding level. Our report
recommended a balanced research agenda, with priority for the following
areas:
 |
Software: Methods for efficiently
creating and maintaining high-quality software of all kinds
and for ensuring the reliability of the complex software systems
that now provide the infrastructure for much of our government
and our economy. |
 |
Scalable Information Infrastructure: Techniques
for ensuring that the National Information Infrastructure consisting
of communications systems, the Internet, large data repositories,
and other emerging systems-is reliable and secure, and can grow
gracefully to accommodate the massive numbers of new users (perhaps
billions) and applications expected over the coming two decades. |
 |
High End Computing: Continued invention and innovation
in the development of fast, powerful computing systems and the
accompanying communication systems are needed to implement critical
science, engineering, and business applications ranging from
aircraft design to weather and climate modeling. |
 |
Social, Economic, and Workforce Implications
of IT: Research directed towards better understanding the sociological
and economic impacts of innovations in information technology
and toward growing the workforce to meet the national need for
information technology professionals.
|
Our recommendation for research to support a scalable information
infrastructure included topics to enable the survivability of our
networks and information. Survivability means that services will be
available when needed and information will be delivered in a timely
fashion. The recommended research agenda includes:
 |
Authentication and security mechanisms for a
large, heterogeneous, and evolving infrastructure |
 |
Mechanisms for detecting system intrusion and
information software corruption |
 |
Mechanisms for detecting, mitigating, responding
to, and recovering from, or for preventing, human error in the
creation and use of the infrastructure |
 |
Mechanisms for assuring information quality |
 |
Scalable information and service replication
strategies |
 |
Mechanisms for monitoring services to ensure
correct operation within given quality-of-service bounds |
 |
Repositories for guaranteed long-term preservation
of information
|
Our report recommendations have received strong bi-partisan support
and we were encouraged by the $235 million increase for IT R&D appropriated
in this year's budget. The President's fiscal year 2001 budget proposes
an increase of nearly $600 million in IT R&D in a balanced research
program that addresses the recommendations in the PITAC report. Proposed
funding includes networking and software research directed towards
technologies to enable more secure, reliable, and dependable networks.
The PITAC applauds the Senate's past support and leadership for IT
R&D and hopes the Senate will support the full set of research priority
areas recommended in our report.
The PITAC report provides broad concepts for a balanced IT R&D program.
While we recognized the importance of network security, reliability,
and dependability, we did not develop a detailed R&D agenda for Internet
security. Our recommendations cover a range of important topics to
be addressed, rather than proposals for specific research projects.
|
The Impact of Internet Downtime on Businesses and Society
Denial of service happens when the network fabric is overloaded through
intentional and unintentional ("legal") overloading of the system
with too many requests. This is analogous to a large number of people
calling California in the event of an earthquake report, or a computer
calling a phone continuously thereby blocking anyone else getting
through in case of an emergency.
The cost of denial of service and overloading can be substantial.
The Yankee Group estimates that the online industry may have lost
$1.2 billion in revenue from the Web site attacks earlier this month.
(WSJ, Feb 24, 2000). A Gartner Group study showed that the average
cost of downtime in brokerage operations is about $6.5 million per
hour! According to the Boston-based market research firm, $29 million
in refunds were paid out by MCI to customers affected by the 10 day
outage of its frame relay network in August 1999. Three thousand companies
were affected. (Online News, 10/28/99). eBay paid $3.9 million in
credits to its customers for the service outage that halted bidding
completely at its popular service for an unprecedented 22 hours in
June 1999. Distributed network sites can lose $20,000 to $80,000 per
hour. (Computer Reseller News, 1998). At a cost of $80,000 per hour,
the average company will lose $7.1 million per year in centralized
network downtime.
These costs are expected to increase as companies incur indirect costs
in the form of lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny, impact on brand name
and public image, loss of customer base, lower employee morale and
productivity, and higher employee stress.
The impact on businesses of system outage can be even more devastating.
In an April 1999 survey of consumers, research firm Jupiter Communications
found that 46 percent leave a preferred site if they experience technical
or performance problems. Statistics from McGladrey and Pullen show
that for every five organizations affected by a disaster, two will
be unable to maintain their critical business functions and make a
recovery. Of the remaining three, one will not survive the next two
years. In fact, a company that experiences a computer outage lasting
more than 10 days will never fully recover financially ("Disaster
Recovery Planning: Managing Risk and Catastrophe in Information Systems"
by Jon Toigo).
According to Cahners in-stat group, Internet downtime hits businesses
financially,
(http://www.instat.com/abstracts/ia/1999/is9906sp_abs.htm), affecting
direct revenue/customer base, compensatory payments, inventory cost,
and depreciation of capital. It also affects business in ways not
seen on the balance sheet, such as market capitalization loss, employee
downtime, and delays to market items that may prove more financially
damaging than the explicit losses associated with an outage. The report
"Data Failure: the financial impact on Internet business" quantifies
the real-cost damages for site outages based on SEC filings and publicly
released information. The report compares two e-commerce business
models and illustrates how much is at stake in the event of data failure.
|
Steps Towards a Secure and Dependable Internet
Many of the problems of Intern
Online businesses can:
 |
Educate users on cyber hygiene, security
tools, and procedures such as use of firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, anti-virus software, automatic daily disinfecting tools,
etc. |
 |
Discourage masquerading and spoofing attacks by
ensuring that network traffic exiting from the local area network
of an organization carries the address consistent with the valid
set of addresses for that organization. |
 |
Protect against inside hacker risk by providing
backup and retrieval from an off-site storage service provider.
Disaster tolerance backup facilities are offered by many suppliers.
Such services guarantee constant availability of data in the
face of technical or natural catastrophe, including surge capabilities
for unplanned swells in site traffic. |
 |
Provide 24 hour-per-day, 7 day-a-week physical
security to central facilities and server farms. Alternatively,
use the backup and retrieval from an off-site storage service
as described in the previous bullet.
|
Industry can:
 |
Release hardware and software that prevents i/nsecure
configurations and provide tools for intrusion detection. |
 |
Re-engineer operating systems and applications
to make them immune to the effects of viruses and other forms
of malicious code. |
 |
Identify and close the security loopholes and
backdoors by working with major vendors to provide access to
the source code and encourage open source movement. |
 |
Develop and deploy a secure communications infrastructure
that can be used by network operators and Internet service providers
to enable real-time collaboration when dealing with attacks.
|
Many of the common sense measures listed above depend on the voluntary
compliance of more than a 100 million Internet users and organizations
that provide Internet service. However, history has shown us that
compliance failures will occur, either unintentionally or maliciously.
Rather than leaving the Internet vulnerable because a few persons
or organizations are careless or reckless, we should develop an information
infrastructure that is not dependent on voluntary compliance of security
practices and policies.
|
Personal Views on a
Strategy for a National
Self Healing Network Testbed
I would now like to make some personal observations and make a specific
recommendation for creating a national self healing network testbed.
The PITAC recommended an aggressive new program in networking research,
including network security. We also recommended expanded research
to explore ways that laws protecting privacy, intellectual property,
and other rights are extended effectively into this new media. We
continue to support increased funding in these critical areas.
The PITAC is currently reviewing federal research plans and will be
issuing new recommendations later this year. Since these new recommendations
are not available, I would like to present my personal views on logical
next steps.
By now we understand the sources of highly publicized Internet crashes:
malicious hacker attacks and "legal" users overloading popular web
sites. Many of the remedies require straightforward implementation
of known solutions, either administrative or legal. However, herein
lies the problem we simply cannot depend on every system to be properly
administered or every person to behave as desired. Instead, we should
strive to develop an Internet infrastructure in which it does not
matter if someone is careless or reckless. In my view, one of the
key goals of networking research over the next few years should be
development of a "self healing" network. A self healing network would
work similar to the human immune system. It would constantly monitor
the system (in this case, the network), analyze what is in the system,
and if it finds something wrong within the system, immediately begin
actions to remedy the problem. A self healing network would be capable
of self-monitoring, self-diagnosing and self-repairing. To accomplish
this, we should establish a national network testbed that can be used
to develop and demonstrate what I will refer to as an "ultra-dependable
Internet." This is similar to an ultra-high speed network, but with
the focus on dependability rather than speed.
I will use the phrase "dependable Internet" to specifically include
attributes such as reliability, availability, and scalability in addition
to security. The operative issue is not "security" as interpreted
narrowly in the research circles but rather "how to create a dependable
Internet Infrastructure" that is as reliable as the current telephone
system. By dependable, I mean a system ("as if my life depended on
it") that is:
 |
reliable, i.e., always up, accessible,
accurate, and consistent, |
 |
available, i.e., a system with no world-wide-wait
and a response time of under 200 milliseconds most of the time, |
 |
scalable, i.e. an infrastructure capable
of scaling to a billion simultaneous users and a trillion inter-connected
devices, and |
 |
secure, i.e. no fear of loss of privacy
and immunity to sniffing and spoofing.
|
The goal of a self healing network is to provide mechanisms for detecting
unauthorized use of networking equipment, tracking inappropriate uses,
and identifying the individuals using networks for malicious intent,
without compromising individual rights to privacy and security on
the network. Over the years we have found ways to balance privacy
and security in traditional commerce. Applying these precedents to
the new networked world will require combining the skills of technologists
and people knowledgeable of the legal, economic, and social issues.
Clearly this is an enormous challenge, but I believe it is a critical
national research challenge and deserves and appropriate response.
|
A Self Healing Network
A self healing network is one which continuously monitors all the
traffic within the system (every packet entering the system is validated
before it can proceed) with a view to detect and disable abnormal
traffic patterns. It is predicated on using "software agents" capable
of self-monitoring, self-diagnosis, and self-repair much as the human
immune system uses (distributed) anti-bodies to disable antigens and
restore balance in the human body. Just as in human systems where
a few people may get sick some of the time, but society as a whole
continues to function, we may accept an occasional denial of service
as long as most users are able to access most of the web sites without
any degradation of service.
Self monitoring within the Internet core fabric requires agents capable
of continuous and autonomous monitoring of "packet" traffic using
"software sensors." "Self repair agents" undertake a set of autonomous
corrective actions against the offending source that is generating
the unusual traffic by dropping the packets or limiting it to a "fair
share" the number of packets entering the fabric. The work of these
agents and the humans tracking network security could be helped if
the new generation of routers add information packets that make it
easier to detect malicious patterns of use and to track the attacks
to their source.
The proposed self healing network will add to the packet handling
overhead at each router in the fabric and has the potential to make
the system slower, waste bandwidth, and compromise privacy. At first
blush, this requirement appears to be impractical, as the Internet
is expected to handle trillions of packets every day and would require
expensive retrofitting of the existing commercial Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). However, such a transition is not only essential
to the future economic growth and security of the nation, but also
practical given the expected exponential advances in processor, memory,
and optical networking technologies. The expected additional overhead
in packet handling will be ameliorated by better algorithms, exponential
improvements in processor (predicted by Moore's law), memory, and
bandwidth technologies and increasing locality of Internet traffic
patterns ("Internet is global and the traffic is local").
In addition to the research needed to develop terabit networks, faster
routers, efficient algorithms, and distributed computation techniques,
research will also be needed for data warehousing of meta-data contained
in packet headers, data mining of this data to establish statistical
parameters that can be used to classify normal and abnormal traffic
requests, and repair strategies for generating a signal (analogous
to the busy signal used in voice telephony) to sites making abnormal
requests without prior arrangement for surge capacity.
|
Conclusion
In conclusion, creating a dependable Internet infrastructure that
is as dependable as telephone service is essential to the future economic
growth and security of the nation. It is possible to create a system
capable of achieving these goals while ensuring absolute protection
of personal privacy and without major reductions in networking speed.
Indeed, rapid advances in computing power and networking speed should
make the new security systems nearly invisible to users. The main
challenge is to find the right balance between having a dependable
Internet infrastructure without compromising the ease of use by non-experts
and protecting the privacy of the individuals connected to the infrastructure.
To accomplish this will require both new research ideas and the uniform
application of known and new ideas across the Internet infrastructure.
It makes sense to apply the creative energies of academe to these
social problems.
Development of networks capable of meeting our goals for security
and privacy will only happen with a concerted research investment
supported by both government and industry. One strategy would be to
support a network testbed designed with the specific goal of evaluating
innovative strategies for network protection including commercial
concepts. Such a testbed would provide useful networking services
and at the same time let commercial operators and government research
organizations evaluate advanced networking security concepts. It is
estimated that market capitalization of Internet based industries
created since 1990 is more than a trillion dollars resulting in capital
gains taxes of more than $200 billion to the nation. Investing a small
fraction of this national income in research towards creating a self
healing Internet will ensure the continuation of this engine of growth!
|
Acknowledgements
This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions from several
PITAC members: Jim Gray, Irving Wladawsky-Berger, Vint Cerf and Bob
Kahn and from other colleagues: Anish Arora, V.S. Arunachalam, Ed
Lazowska, and Rich Pethia. |
|
|
|