

# Trusted CI Update

**Jim Basney**

Director and PI, Trusted CI

MAGIC at SC22

November 15, 2022



# Trusted CI: The NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

Our mission: to lead in the development of an NSF Cybersecurity Ecosystem with the workforce, knowledge, processes, and cyberinfrastructure that enables trustworthy science and NSF's vision of a nation that is a global leader in research and innovation.



<https://trustedci.org/>

# Trusted CI: Impacts

*Updated impact as of March 2022:*

Trusted CI has positively impacted over 500 NSF projects since inception in 2012.

Members of more than 380 NSF projects have attended our NSF Cybersecurity Summit.

Members of more than 250 NSF projects have attended our monthly webinars.

We have provided more than 500 hours of training to the community.

We've had 64 engagements with NSF funded projects, including ten NSF Large Facilities.



## Trusted CI Impacts Report

March 2022  
*For Public Distribution*

Jeannette Dopheide<sup>1</sup>, John Zage<sup>2</sup>, Jim Basney<sup>3</sup>

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
Dopheide, Jeannette, Zage, John, & Basney, Jim.  
(2022). Trusted CI Impacts Report (2022). Zenodo.  
<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6374207>




# What is Cyberinfrastructure (CI)?

"The comprehensive infrastructure needed to capitalize on dramatic advances in information technology has been termed cyberinfrastructure (CI). Cyberinfrastructure integrates hardware for computing, data and networks, digitally-enabled sensors, observatories and experimental facilities, and an interoperable suite of software and middleware services and tools. "

-NSF Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery



# NSF BY THE NUMBERS



# NSF Cyberinfrastructure

- Major Facilities / Large Facilities
- Mid-scale Facilities
- ACCESS Resource Providers
- Campus Cyberinfrastructure (CC\*)
- Software & Services (CICI, CSSI, etc.)
- People & Expertise (CyberTraining)

# NSF Major Facilities (examples)

Facility	Managing Institution(s)
Arecibo Observatory	University of Central Florida
Academic Research Fleet	University of Washington, Oregon State University
IceCube Neutrino Observatory	University of Wisconsin
International Ocean Discovery Program	Texas A&M, University of California-San Diego (Scripps Institution of Oceanography)
Leadership-Class Computing Facility	University of Texas, Austin
Large Hadron Collider	SUNY Stony Brook, Columbia University, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Cornell University
Laser Interferometer Gravitational-wave Observatory	California Institute of Technology
National High Magnetic Field Lab	Florida State University



# JASON Report on Facilities Cybersecurity

- 7 recommendations on risk assessment, strategy coordination, annual reviews, incident response, resourcing, planning, and national security:  
[https://www.nsf.gov/news/special\\_reports/jasonreportcybersecurity/](https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/jasonreportcybersecurity/)
- Trusted CI support, aligned with the Framework:  
<https://trustedci.org/2022-jason-report>
- New NSF Cybersecurity Advisor for Research Infrastructure position  
<https://beta.nsf.gov/careers/openings/od/od/od-2022-87834>



# NSF Science and Compliance

While many cybersecurity compliance programs exist (*e.g.* HIPAA, FISMA, NIST 800-171), most NSF research (*e.g.* astronomy, climate, physics, geology) does not fall under a compliance program.

We coordinate with the Regulated Research Community of Practice (RRCoP) on compliance aspects:

<https://www.regulatedresearch.org/>



*Gemini South on the summit of Cerro Pachón in Chile (left) and Gemini North on the summit of Maunakea in Hawai'i (right).*

Image credit: Gemini/NSF/AURA

# NSF Cybersecurity Governance

NSF does not prescribe cybersecurity - it is the responsibility of the awardee.



*"NSF's responsibility is for overseeing the Recipient's development and management of the facility as well as assuring the successful performance of the funded activities. **The Recipient is responsible for the day-to-day management of the facility.**"*

NSF Research Infrastructure Guide (NSF 21-107), December 2021. Emphasis from source document.

# The Value of the NSF Approach

NSF's approach allows NSF projects the flexibility to shape their cybersecurity program to best support their science mission.





# Cybersecurity supports organizational mission

Organizational mission translates into different priorities for cybersecurity.

Imagine the program for a bank and hospital – confidentiality, availability, Integrity, resilience, etc. are all prioritized differently.



# The Trusted CI Framework

The Trusted CI Framework establishes **best cybersecurity practices** for cybersecurity programs.

- 16 clear and concise requirements.
- Based on best practices and evidence of what works.
- Designed to be universal and timeless.

It focuses on cybersecurity programmatic:

**Mission Alignment**, **Governance**, **Resources**, and **Controls**.

This goes beyond technical controls to address the full spectrum of cybersecurity best practices.



<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

# Framework Implementation Guide for Research Cyberinfrastructure Operators



The guide gives research organizations a community-tailored head start on choosing among good paths and avoiding treacherous ones.

Includes:

- roadmaps for establishing mature cybersecurity programs
- tailored advice on overcoming common challenges
- pointers to resources, including our publicly available tools and templates

Built by Trusted CI's experienced multi-institutional team, and vetted by a **Framework Advisory Board** representing the diversity of our community.

<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>





# Framework Adopters

## Example Framework Adopters:

- FABRIC
- GAGE
- LIGO
- NOIRLab
- NRAO
- NSO
- OOI
- ResearchSOC



GAGE




<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

# Open Science Cyber Risk Profile (OSCRP)

OSCRP helps science projects understand cybersecurity risks to their science infrastructure and facilitates discussing those risks with their campus security office.

2023 updates include Science DMZ, Software Assurance, Operational Technology, and Cloud Computing elements.

<https://trustedci.org/oscrp/>



*Example mapping from OSCRP of cybersecurity attacks to scientific consequences.*

# Growing Ransomware Risk to Science

Ransomware has changed the cybercrime landscape, broadly expanding potential victims to include hospitals, schools, cities, and researchers.

Trusted CI Collaboration with Michigan State University office of the CIO to document impact of ransomware attack on research.

Report available at:

[hdl.handle.net/2022/26638](https://hdl.handle.net/2022/26638)



Research at Risk:  
Ransomware Attack on Physics and Astronomy Case Study

Aug 1, 2021

*Distribution: Public*

Authors: Andrew Adams<sup>1</sup>, Tom Siu, Julie Songer, Von Welch

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<sup>1</sup> Engagement Lead, Andrew Adams



# Software Assurance

<https://www.trustedci.org/software-assurance>

## 2021 Annual Challenge

Interviewed six large CI project who develop scientific software to understand their practices surrounded software security. Produced a "Findings" document report on the state of the art.

To provide direction in developing secure software, we produced the initial version of the "Guide to Securing Scientific Software". This is a living document with ongoing development this year.

## Software Secure Training

Free and open online resources (cc'd in English & Spanish), including extensive hands-on exercises and instructor materials:

<https://research.cs.wisc.edu/mist/SoftwareSecurityCourse/>

Teach tutorials at conferences, workshops, labs, and government agencies.

## In-depth vulnerability assessment

Have done multiple project engagements.

Development new techniques to automate such assessments.

## Ransomware

Developing comprehensive threat model of ransomware attacks.



# Science Gateways Security



Science Gateways  
Community Institute

September 2013: "Science Gateway Security Recommendations" at the Science Gateway Institute Workshop in Indianapolis

Partnership with Science Gateways Community Institute (SGCI) since 2016

Participation at Gateways conference and SGCI Focus Weeks

Engagements with ChemCOMpute, COIN-OR, COSMIC2, CyberGIS, Data@Risk, EarthCube, Galaxy, GenAPP, GISandbox, Hydroshare, Ike Wai, I-TASSER, SciGaP, SeedMeLab

September 2021: "Recommendations For Improving the Security of a Science Gateway"



## Science Gateway Security Recommendations

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**Abstract**—A science gateway is a web portal that provides a convenient interface to data and applications in support of a research community. Standard security concerns apply to science gateways, including confidentiality of pre-publication data, integrity of research results, and availability of provided to researchers. In this paper we identify existing gateway security recommendations and provide a perspective.

full discussion, see [5]. Examples of this science gateway include CIPRES [8] and GENIUS.

**Keywords**—science gateways; security

### I. INTRODUCTION

Science gateways must address a range of security concerns, providing trustworthy service to researchers, maintain the external resource providers, and properly use resources in compliance with security policies. In this paper we reference prior work providing science security recommendations and add our recommendations on our experience.

### II. SCIENCE GATEWAY MODELS

Science gateways have at least three different deployment models in terms of how they interact with external resources.

1. A science gateway may support only users of the resources, meaning the science gateway basically provides a different interface to the resource(s) without otherwise changing the user management process of that resource. An example of this sort of science gateway is the TensChord Visualization Gateway [6].
2. A science gateway's resources may be entirely deployed to the science gateway and managed by it. In this science gateway manages its own users. An example of this sort of science gateway is The Rosetta Online That Includes Everyone (ROSEIE) [7].
3. A science gateway may have its own user community runs in a community account on the resources that it using, community credentials or robot certificate case, described in more detail in [3], represents a trust relationship between the science gateway and resource provider, with the provider having delegated some security and user management functions to the science gateway. The science gateway may or may not expose user identity information to the resources.

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant numbers 1127219 and 1234408.

## Recommendations For Improving the Security of a Science Gateway



ated cybersecurity time and funding  
takeaways to empower science

research, [Trusted CI](#) has partnered with  
security expertise for high-powered  
through this partnership we have worked  
cybersecurity challenges. The following  
science gateway community and are  
by a typical small science gateway team.

[framework Must\(s\)](#) most relevant to the  
challenge related to the Musts, science  
[Implementation Guide for Research](#)

<https://trustedci.org/sciencegateways>

s, exposing SSH to attackers. To ensure  
practices: enable two-factor  
utilize an automated blocking  
only authentication and disable password  
algorithms; filter (when possible) known

[Zhan, CIS Controls #16](#)

service availability through the threat  
to monitor the system and send issue  
daily summary emails,  
[controls #8](#)


# Science DMZ Security

- Partnered with EPOC, University of Arkansas / DART project on Science DMZ focused engagement
- Created reusable template security documents related to Science DMZs
- Published Security of Science DMZ whitepaper
  - <https://hdl.handle.net/2022/27007>
  - Help senior leadership to understand security of Science DMZs
  - Summarize and expand on security recommendations
  - Provide links to more resources





# Scientific OT





# Scientific Support OT

Also:

Building HVAC


Cranes

Winches

Antenna controllers

Electronic door controls

Environmental monitoring



Two wind profiler radars (large white boxes) on the deck of the R/V Menai. One is a 300W and the other is a 100W. There is also a RASS system and an S-band vertically pointing radar (the arm at the end).



# OT Security Study Findings

- Security is a missing element for OT procurement requirements.
- Organizational “siloing” between IT security personnel and OT operators.
- Some host institutions (e.g., universities) can help MFs with IT/OT security but even they may not have OT security expertise appropriate to instruments in MFs.
- Newer OT (acquired in the past five years) — is increasingly “software defined” — contains exactly the same vulnerabilities as traditional IT systems.

<https://www.trustedci.org/operational-technology>



## Findings of the 2022 Trusted CI Study on the Security of Operational Technology in NSF Scientific Research

July 13, 2022

Status: Draft Report v1.0

*Distribution: Public*


Emily K. Adams, Daniel Gunter, Ryan Kiser, Mark Krenz, Sean Peisert, Susan Sons, and John Zage



# Trusted CI Fellows Program

- Training cybersecurity champions
- Supporting NSF science
- Applications for 2023 now open


<https://trustedci.org/fellows>





# Trusted CI Webinars

- Call for 2023 webinar topics now open
- Visit <https://www.trustedci.org/webinars> for recordings and presentation materials





# Annual NSF Cybersecurity Summit

One day of training and workshops.

1.5 days of plenary sessions.

Lessons learned and success from community.

October 18-20, 2022 in Bloomington, Indiana and online.

October 2023 in Berkeley, California.

<https://trustedci.org/summit/>





# Trusted CI Partners

<https://trustedci.org/partners>





# CI Compass and Trusted CI

- Two of the premier CoEs funded by NSF/OAC to help the NSF science community.
- Co-developed a Federated Identity Management Cookbook
- Share CoE best practices and lessons learned.
- Have standing and open communication and collaboration channels

Not sure which center to approach with a question or challenge?

Approach either and we'll collaboratively figure out how to best help you.



<https://ci-compass.org/>

# Staying Connected with Trusted CI

## Trusted CI Webinars

4th Monday of month at 11am ET.

<https://trustedci.org/webinars>

## Follow Us

<https://trustedci.org>

<https://blog.trustedci.org>

@TrustedCI 

## Slack

Email [ask@trustedci.org](mailto:ask@trustedci.org) for an invitation.



## Email Lists

Announce and Discuss

<https://trustedci.org/trustedci-email-lists>

## Ask Us Anything

No question too big or too small.

[info@trustedci.org](mailto:info@trustedci.org)

## Cyberinfrastructure Vulnerabilities

Latest news on security vulnerabilities tailored for cyberinfrastructure community.

<https://trustedci.org/vulnerabilities/>

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Trusted CI activities are made possible thanks to the contributions of a multi-institutional team:  
<https://trustedci.org/who-we-are/>





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