

# Security Issues in Radar-Communications Spectrum Sharing

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



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# Focus of this briefing

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The new security issues that arise in **radar-communications** spectrum sharing **between separate organizations**



Radar-radar spectrum sharing:

- is designed into radars already
- raises no new security issues for the spectrum community

Sharing within a single organization:

- will see first deployments soon
- raises no new security issues for the spectrum community

# Context of radar-communications spectrum sharing

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- Assume a shared band where radar is primary
- Current use cases
  - Weather radars
  - Air search and tracking radars
    - Mobile – Naval
    - Fixed – Civil Air Traffic Control
- Potential use cases
  - Vehicular radars – ground, aerial, altimeters
- Technical issues considered in isolation
  - Mitigation of bidirectional interference is challenging but solvable
  - 15 years of work on this topic starting with FCC 5 GHz DFS proceeding
- Adding security concerns makes the problem much harder

# Denial of Service Attacks

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- DOS attacks on the radar
  - Direct jamming by communications systems (physical layer attack)
  - Attack that causes radar's spectrum sharing control system to thrash
  - Vectors:
    - Malware in communications devices
    - Cyber attack on spectrum control/support systems (e.g. SAS, ESC, data link from radar)
    - Insider attack on spectrum control/support systems
- DOS attacks on the communication system
  - Vectors:
    - Same 3
    - Spoof transmission of a radar signal
    - Cause radar to trigger hard shutdown of communications system in the band
      - Spoof transmission of comms signal
      - Malware causes misbehavior by (a few) comms devices

# Privacy Violation Attacks

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- Attacks on radar privacy (issue today)
  - Security concern: reduce cost for adversary to collect information about the radar
    - Location of mobile radars
    - Operating state, waveform shape, pulse timing (military only)
  - Vectors
    - Same 3 as for DOS attacks
    - Harvest observations from a large number of comms devices
    - Harvest history information from spectrum control/support systems
- Attacks on comms system privacy (potential future issue)
  - Load, usage, operating state (business intelligence)
  - Application layer data
  - Vectors
    - Use radar as SIGINT device

# Solution Principles – DOS attacks

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## 1. Assume the sharing system will malfunction

- Requires backup mechanism to protect critical operational capability
- Backup mechanism must have high reliability, may have low spectrum efficiency
- See example on Slide 8

## 2. Graduated responses to violations

- Force attacker to sustain attack over time, issue it from many locations, to cause big response
- Simplifies detection of attacks
- Facilitates collection of information to ID attacker/vector
- Increases attack cost, thus reducing number of capable attackers and number of attacks

# Solution Principles – Privacy Attacks

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- Obfuscation is a primary method
  - Must balance privacy gain against loss of spectrum efficiency
- 3. Share the information yourself or lose control of it
  - Failure to share just forces the other side to build a sensor system to gather the information
  - The sensor system may gather private information
  - Lose the ability to control the obfuscation – raw data now vulnerable to sensor system insiders
- 4. Agree a spectrum access SLA between the parties
  - Enables all sides to plan
  - Can continually obfuscate up to the SLA level
    - NOT constant spectrum usage
    - Statistical access guarantees – e.g. lose usage of a channel for X days per year
  - Creates a policy challenge about how to evolve SLA over time

# Example: Reliable mechanism to mitigate radar DOS in CBRS

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- SAS channel access grants are (crypto authenticated) time limited leases
  - Enforce lease timeouts at a low (firmware) level in comms devices
- Radar operator can push a “big red button”
  - Causes SAS in that area tell all comms devices in the area to evacuate the band immediately.
  - SAS then shuts down (!) – handles case there is malware or fault in the SAS
- Correctly operating comms devices evacuate the shared band when:
  - SAS evacuate command
  - Loss of contact with SAS
- Compromised or buggy comms devices cease transmission when the TLL expires.
- Every push of the big red button is treated like an airplane accident.
  - The NTSB equivalent (SSSB?) investigates and prepares a public report.
  - Whoever pushed the button needs to have a defensible reason.



# Thank You

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